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A Sour Carrot and a Big Stick: Reviving Antitrust 
Enforcement After Stolt-Nielsen1 
Iris Tilley2 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2006 decision to, for the second time, 
deny certiorari of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals antitrust case Stolt-
Nielsen, S.A., et. al., v. United States3 went largely unnoticed by most 
American consumers.  All the major legal newspapers mentioned the 
incident, but outside of law firms, it sparked little water cooler discussion.  
It did not make the morning news, and a Dateline exposé is not likely to 
result.  Despite this lukewarm response, the Court’s decision was big news 
for businesses and consumers across America.  
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals established that 
parties who enter into immunity agreements under the Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) Corporate Lenience Policy (CLP) are not entitled to a 
preindictment review if the DOJ alleges that the party has breached the 
terms of its immunity agreement.4  That is, if the DOJ believes that a party 
has breached the terms of its immunity agreement, the DOJ can file charges 
against the corporation or individual without first judicially establishing that 
the corporation or individual is actually in breach.5  This means that 
regardless of the terms of a party’s immunity agreement and the 
incriminating information the party has already provided pursuant to the 
agreement’s protection, in the Third Judicial Circuit—which includes 
Delaware (where over 50 percent of the United States’ publicly-traded 
companies are incorporated)—the DOJ can unilaterally abrogate the terms 
of the immunity agreement and indict a party previously protected by the 
agreement’s terms.6 
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The importance of the Third Circuit’s holding and the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision to deny certiorari of the appeal stems from two distinct 
and equally important factors.  The first factor is the devastating impact 
anticompetitive behavior can have on both consumers and businesses, and 
the second factor is the inherent difficulty involved in discovering and 
prosecuting antitrust violators.  
Anticompetitive behavior robs U.S. consumers of hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually.7  One way that companies accomplish this appropriation is 
by forming cartels with their competitors.8  Within these cartels, the 
member companies often agree to fix prices, rig bids, or allocate customers 
among the members.9  As a result, the companies within each cartel do not 
have to compete with one another, so they can increase prices to artificially 
high levels.  Consequently, quality and innovation often fall to the 
wayside.10  This leaves law-abiding companies at a distinct disadvantage 
within the market because they are not privy to the manipulated market 
conditions enjoyed by cartel members.  Ultimately, consumers pick up the 
bill through inflated market prices.11  
Antitrust laws are problematic to enforce because cartel activity is 
secretive and, as a result, is difficult to detect and prove.12  As exemplified 
by the CLP, the DOJ has historically attempted to mitigate this difficulty by 
combining a carrot and a stick approach.13  While the sweetness of the 
carrot and the size of the stick have varied over time, the structure of the 
CLP has always been to provide some form of immunity to parties that 
come forward to disclose their own antitrust violations (the carrot), and 
some form of fines and criminal penalties for those parties that fail to 
disclose their activities at all or fail to disclose them in a timely manner (the 
stick).14  The DOJ’s initial version of the CLP was not very effective, but in 
1993, the department revamped the program by bolstering the immunity it 
offered self-reporting violators.15  Since the CLP was revamped, 
applications for immunity under the program have increased from one per 
year to two per month, and the DOJ has collected millions of dollars in fines 
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from the resulting prosecutions.16  However, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ ruling in Stolt-Nielsen and the Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari threaten to undermine the success of the CLP because they 
eliminate much of the incentive for a company to self-report 
anticompetitive behavior.17   
The precedent left in Stolt-Nielsen’s wake undermines the purpose of the 
CLP because it is likely to discourage antitrust violators from self-reporting 
antitrust violations, and consumers and businesses are likely to suffer the 
consequences.  Consequently, Congress should mitigate the impact of Stolt-
Nielsen though an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) 
designed to reincentivize companies to self-report antitrust violations.  
However, unless and until such legislation is codified, the DOJ should, on 
its own initiative, preserve the CLP’s effectiveness by seeking 
preindictment review of alleged breaches of immunity agreements.  
Part I of this comment provides a brief overview of antitrust law and 
addresses the history of immunity, including discussions of statutory 
immunity, informal immunity, corporate cooperation agreements, and the 
interpretation of informal immunity agreements.  Part II explains and 
analyzes the details of the Third Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen and the 
precedent left in its wake.  Lastly, Part III proposes a draft amendment to 
the Sherman Act designed to resurrect corporate immunity, discusses the 
reasoning and justification behind the amendment, and, recognizing the 
difficulties inherent in enacting a legislative solution, proposes steps the 
DOJ should take now to preserve the CLP’s effectiveness.   
I. ANTITRUST AND IMMUNITY 
As a framework for the forthcoming discussion on the impact Stolt-
Nielsen is likely to have on antitrust violators, this section provides an 
overview of federal antitrust laws; a summary of the function and types of 
immunity, including corporate cooperation agreements; and a discussion of 
how immunity agreements are generally interpreted by the courts.  
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A. Federal Antitrust Law 
While most states maintain their own state-specific antitrust laws, there 
are three major federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Act, the Clayton 
Antitrust Act (Clayton Act), and the Federal Trade Commission Act.18  
Most pertinent for this comment, the Sherman Act is the oldest of the 
federal antitrust laws and prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations.”19  The Sherman Act 
provides for criminal punishment of some antitrust violations as felonies.20  
Only the DOJ is empowered to bring criminal prosecutions under the 
Sherman Act.21  In contrast, the Clayton Act is a civil statute targeted at 
preventing mergers and acquisitions that are likely to lessen competition.22  
In 1936, section 2 of the Clayton Act was amended through the addition of 
the Robinson-Patman Act.23  The Robinson-Patman Act targets price 
discrimination by explicitly prohibiting any person engaged in commerce 
from discriminating in price between competing purchasers of commodities 
of like grade and quality where the effect may be to substantially lessen 
competition in any line of commerce.24  Finally, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act prohibits some of the same behavior as the Sherman Act 
but carries no criminal penalties.25  Significantly, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act is the enabling act for creation of the Federal Trade 
Commission, and through it, the Federal Trade Commission is vested with 
the authority to police violations of the Act.26   
As touched upon in the introduction, while anticompetitive activities are 
clearly illegal, they are secretive in nature, so they can be exceedingly 
difficult to identify and prosecute.27  As a result, the DOJ has historically 
relied on consumers and businesses to report anticompetitive activity.28  On 
the business side, it sought to further this goal through the use of corporate 
cooperation agreements through which companies that had participated in 
anticompetitive activity could receive some form of immunity from 
prosecution for cooperating with the DOJ.29  In 1978, the DOJ launched its 
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first version of the CLP.30  This initial version of the CLP saw little success.  
Until it was amended in 1993, on average, only one company came forward 
each year to report a violation.31   
In August 1993, the DOJ addressed the deficiencies of the initial CLP by 
revising it to provide added protections for participating corporations.32  
Specifically, the program was revamped to offer (1) immunity from 
prosecution for companies not yet under investigation that reported 
anticompetitive activity; (2) immunity options for corporations already 
under investigation that reported violations; and (3) protection for officers, 
directors, and employees who cooperated with investigations.33   
First, companies coming forward to report anticompetitive activity that 
were not already under investigation by the DOJ could receive automatic 
immunity if (1) upon discovering the unlawful activity, the company took 
prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity; (2) the 
company provided full, continuing, and complete cooperation to the DOJ 
throughout the investigation; (3) the confession was a corporate act, not an 
isolated confession of an individual executive or official; (4) the company 
made restitution to injured parties, when possible; (5) the company was not 
the leader or originator of the activity; and (6) the company did not coerce 
any other parties to join the illegal activity.34   
Second, companies already under investigation by the DOJ that came 
forward to report anticompetitive activity could receive immunity if they 
met seven distinct conditions: (1) the company must have been the first 
member of the cartel to come forward and qualify for leniency; (2) the DOJ 
must not already have evidence against the company likely to result in a 
substantial conviction; (3) the company, upon discovery of the illegal 
activity, must have taken prompt and effective action to terminate its part in 
the activity; (4) the company must have reported the illegal activity with 
candor and offered continuing and complete cooperation that advanced the 
DOJ’s investigation; (5) the confession of illegal activity must have been a 
corporate act rather than isolated confessions of individual executives or 
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officials; (6) the company must have made restitution to injured parties if 
possible; and (7) considering the circumstances, the DOJ must determine 
that granting leniency would not be unfair to others.35  Under the CLP, 
“leniency” is defined as freedom from prosecution.36  
Third, officers, directors, and employees could receive immunity for 
cooperating with investigators.  This change expanded the CLP by allowing 
for immunity in two separate ways.37  If a corporation qualified for 
immunity under the first prong of the CLP, all of its officers, directors, and 
employees who admitted their involvement as part of the corporate 
confession would receive automatic immunity.38  Alternatively, if a 
corporation did not qualify for immunity under the first prong of the CLP, 
all of its officers, directors, and employees who initially came forward with 
the corporation would be considered for immunity under the same standards 
as if they had approached the DOJ individually.39  (Please see Appendix A 
for the full text of the revised CLP.)  
The DOJ and antitrust commentators have hailed the revised CLP as a 
decided success.40  The DOJ has even gone so far as to call the CLP its 
“single greatest investigative tool,”41 and others have called it the DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division’s “primary weapon” in criminal antitrust prosecution.42  
The DOJ has specifically credited the CLP with greatly increasing corporate 
sanctions.43  The CLP has been so successful that it has motivated other 
countries to adopt nearly identical programs throughout the world.44  Those 
countries include Canada, the European Union (EU), Australia, Brazil, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, and Estonia.45  Of particular note is the 
corporate leniency program established by the European Commission.46  
Inspired by the success of the DOJ’s CLP in the United States, the 
European Commission launched its own corporate leniency program in 
1996.47 The program led to a significant increase in the number of cartels 
that the EU uncovered and punished, and in 2001, the EU’s total annual 
fines even surpassed the highest annual fines ever imposed by the United 
States.48  
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Following the DOJ’s revisions to the CLP, it strengthened the stick of 
antitrust fines and criminal penalties in two distinct ways.  First, in 1994, it 
succeeded in getting the International Antitrust Enforcement Act passed by 
Congress.49  The Act allows the United States to enter into agreements with 
foreign antitrust agencies to exchange investigative information.50  After the 
Act, the DOJ could increase the reach of its enforcement arm by using the 
information obtained by other countries to prosecute anticompetitive 
behavior in the United States and encourage other countries to prosecute 
international violators by sharing its investigative materials.51  Thus, a 
company facing prosecution in the United States for antitrust crimes could 
face prosecution in multiple other countries.  
 Second, in 2004, Congress passed the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPER) of 2004.52  Under the ACPER, 
fines under the Sherman Act were increased to $100,000,000 for 
corporations and $1,000,000 for individuals, and prison sentences were 
increased to ten years.53  
B. Immunity  
While corporate cooperation agreements, like those fostered under the 
CLP and similar international programs, are clearly the most relevant form 
of immunity from an antitrust prospective, an overview of immunity in 
general is necessary to clearly understand the importance of immunity as a 
tool for criminal prosecutors.54 
Immunity is, in the most fundamental sense, a tool to assist prosecutors 
with obtaining the information necessary to prosecute crimes.55  
Specifically, it offers prosecutors a way to obtain information that a witness 
is not inclined to provide without violating the witness’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.56  Immunity takes two main forms: 
statutory and informal immunity. 
Statutory immunity comes into play when a witness refuses, on the basis 
of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to testify 
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or provide other information in a proceeding “before or ancillary to—(1) a 
court or a grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United 
States, or (3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two 
Houses, or a committee or subcommittee of either House.”57  Statutory 
immunity allows the person presiding over the proceeding to compel the 
witness to testify through a court order.58  Witnesses compelled to testify 
pursuant to statutory immunity must testify; however, with limited 
exceptions, prosecutors are prohibited from using any information thus 
compelled in a subsequent criminal prosecution of that witness.59  The idea 
is that immunity displaces the witness’s fear of prosecution, thus 
eliminating the need for Fifth Amendment protections.60  While not of 
significant relevance to this comment, state law also often provides for 
statutory immunity for cases heard in state court.61   
Statutory immunity is well-defined.  The Supreme Court has held that a 
witness compelled to testify must receive at least use plus derivative use 
immunity.62  Use plus derivative use immunity, first adopted in 1972 by the 
Court in Kastiger v. United States,63 prohibits prosecutors from using 
compelled testimony directly against the witness in the trial at hand or in 
future trials.64  Before the Court adopted the standard of use plus derivative 
use immunity, the Court enforced the use of transactional immunity, a much 
broader form of immunity.65  Unlike use plus derivative use immunity, 
transactional immunity protects witnesses from ever facing prosecution 
based on issues arising from the immunized testimony.66  Today, 
prosecutors may grant transactional immunity, but they are only required to 
grant use plus derivative use immunity.67 
Unlike statutory immunity, which arises because a witness is compelled 
to testify, informal immunity is the result of a contractual agreement 
between the government and a witness.68  As a result, informal immunity 
differs from statutory immunity in a number of significant respects.  First, 
from a procedural prospective, informal immunity does not require a court 
order.69  Second, because informal immunity is based on contract law, the 
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parties are free to bargain for and agree to any form of immunity.70  The 
parties must simply agree to the terms of the particular agreement.71  As a 
result, informal immunity may ultimately offer a witness more or less 
protection than statutory immunity.72  Despite this uncertainty, the validity 
of informal immunity agreements has frequently been upheld.73  Third, 
because informal immunity agreements are based on contracts, they can be 
voided for material breach.74  Consequently, a witness testifying under an 
informal immunity agreement can choose to breach the agreement at any 
time by asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege on the witness stand.75  A 
witness who elects to assert this privilege, however, will lose the benefits 
bargained for in his or her informal immunity agreement.76  Furthermore, a 
prosecutor is only permitted to ask questions within the scope of the 
immunity agreement.77   
C. Interpreting Informal Immunity Agreements 
In areas like antitrust law, where the underlying activity is difficult to 
identify without proactive measures on the part of the violators, informal 
immunity agreements such as the conditional leniency agreement entered 
into by Stolt-Nielsen play a significant role in prosecution.  However, with 
their significant role often comes difficult interpretation problems.  
Informal immunity agreements are contractual in nature and, as such, are 
interpreted according to general principals of contract law.78  In the simplest 
terms, if the disclosing party performs his or her end of the bargain, the 
government is bound to perform its promise and the terms of the immunity 
agreement will be enforced.79  However, if the disclosing party materially 
breaches his or her commitments under the immunity agreement, the 
government can be released from its reciprocal obligations.80  This analysis 
is slightly complicated by due process concerns, which require the 
government to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that the 
defendant breached the agreement and that the breach was significantly 
material to warrant recision.81  Additionally, any ambiguity must be 
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resolved in favor of the witness.82  The idea behind this concept is that the 
witness gave up his or her constitutional right to remain silent by providing 
the government with incriminating evidence, therefore the government 
should not be able to abrogate the witness’s immunity agreement without 
significant reason.83   
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced the importance of 
immunity agreements in United States v. Castaneda84 when it reversed the 
defendant’s conviction because the government had improperly revoked the 
defendant’s immunity agreement.85  However, in addition to reinforcing the 
importance of immunity agreements, Castaneda highlighted the difficulty 
inherent in determining whether or not a defendant has actually breached an 
immunity agreement.86  In Castaneda, the defendant was convicted of 
involvement in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO) conspiracy.87  From 1990 to 1994, the defendant, who owned an 
auto repair shop and towing service, conspired with a county attorney to 
solicit bribes from individuals accused of driving while intoxicated in 
exchange for getting their charges dismissed or their sentences reduced.88  
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation began to investigate the 
County Attorney’s Office, it sought Castaneda’s cooperation.89  
Accordingly, Castaneda entered into a written immunity agreement and a 
verbal transactional immunity agreement with the government.90  The 
verbal transactional immunity agreement provided that Castaneda was 
required to “tell everything that he knew” about the county attorney’s 
criminal activity.91  
In reliance on these immunity agreements, Castaneda acknowledged his 
role in the criminal activity and identified a number of additional 
individuals who either had knowledge of the scheme or had been involved 
in the scheme.92  Nearly a year after Castaneda acknowledged his role in the 
scheme, the government advised him that “because he had ‘failed to provide 
. . . relevant and material information concerning criminal activities of 
which he was well aware,’ he had violated the transactional immunity 
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agreement, so the government was revoking its promise not to prosecute.”93  
The following day, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against 
Castaneda.94  Castaneda was convicted, but the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the government breached its 
immunity agreement by prosecuting Castaneda.95 
Noting that no clear Fifth Circuit law addressed what constituted 
“material breach” of a non-prosecution agreement, the court applied the 
definition used in general contract law.96  Under this interpretation, a breach 
is not material unless the non-breaching party is deprived of the benefit of 
the bargain.97  The court noted that “[t]he less the non-breaching party is 
deprived of the expected benefits, the less material the breach.”98  As a 
further clarification of the concept, the Castaneda court noted that other 
courts within the circuit had clarified the concept of material breach by 
comparing it to the concept of substantial performance.99  Under this 
approach, if a party’s “nonperformance . . . is innocent, does not thwart the 
purpose of the bargain, and is wholly dwarfed by the party’s performance, 
the breaching party has substantially performed under the contract, and the 
non-breaching party is not entitled to recision.”100  The court noted that this 
approach was just as applicable to determining the materiality of breach of 
non-prosecution agreements.101  No other circuits have explicitly disagreed.  
In Castaneda, the court reasoned that the defendant’s relatively 
insignificant omissions “pale[d]” in comparison to the information he had 
provided.102  Specifically, the court noted that Castaneda had provided the 
court with substantial detailed accounts of bribery involving the other 
defendant and seven other individuals.103  The court reasoned that in light of 
these significant disclosures, Castaneda’s omission regarding his own 
involvement in two of the dismissed charges did not constitute material 
breach.104  The court noted that “[i]n the absence of proof of substantial or 
intentional omissions by Castaneda constituting prejudice to the 
government, the district court erred in permitting the government to revoke 
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the non-prosecution agreement with Castaneda and prosecute him in this 
case.”105 
In contrast, other Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have declared 
that a defendant’s breach was sufficient to warrant recision when the 
defendant’s conduct had a substantial impact on collection of relevant 
information.  For example, in United States v. Ballis, the court allowed 
recision of the defendant’s plea agreement because he had withheld 
information, offered untruthful testimony, and induced the plea agreement 
through fraud.106  In Hentz v. Harget, the court held that the defendant’s 
statement to the prosecutor that he intended to change his testimony was 
enough to amount to anticipatory repudiation, which justified a revocation 
of the agreement.107  A witness’s failure to cooperate by refusing to meet 
with governmental representatives and testify before a grand jury has also 
been interpreted as sufficient to constitute material breach.108  Additionally, 
in United States v. Donahey, the court held that a defendant who provided 
evasive, misleading, and unverifiable answers had breached the terms of his 
immunity agreement.109   
In United States v. Crawford, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
adopted a test partly defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
holding that the factors important for determining whether a breach is 
material are:  
(1) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the 
benefit which he reasonably expected; (2) the likelihood that the 
party failing to perform will cure his failure; and (3) the extent to 
which the behavior of the party failing to perform comports with 
the standards of due process and fair dealing.110 
In addition to those factors applied by the Crawford court, the Restatement 
also considers the extent to which the injured party can be adequately 
compensated for the part of the benefit of which he was deprived and the 
extent to which the party failing to perform or offering to perform will 
suffer forfeiture.111  Where discovery of particular information is not a 
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condition precedent to the immunity agreement, the government cannot 
repudiate the agreement for failure to get that information from a particular 
witness.112  
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a more rigorous standard, holding that the 
government must prove “bad faith, intention, and [a] substantial omission” 
on the part of the defendant before it can be released from its obligation.113  
Much like the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit has adopted the concept of 
substantial performance.114   
While courts have generally construed informal immunity agreements by 
using the interpretative concepts of contract law, the issue of whether 
preindictment review of an alleged breach of an immunity agreement—the 
issue in Stolt-Nielsen—has rarely arisen.115  Prior to Stolt-Nielsen, this issue 
had only arisen in two cases: United States v. Verrusio116 and United States 
v. Meyer.117  In Verrusio, a Seventh Circuit case, the court recognized that 
when the government suspects breach of a plea agreement, the best 
procedure for the government to take might be to begin with a motion to 
release it from its obligations under the agreement, but it held that 
preindictment review of whether a defendant breached a plea agreement is 
only required if exigent circumstances exist.118  Similiarly, in Meyers, the 
court failed to establish a strict rule.  Rather, in dicta, the Meyers court 
stated that “the preferred procedure, absent exigent circumstances, would be 
for the government to seek relief from its obligations under the immunity 
agreement prior to indictment.”119 
II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF STOLT-NIELSEN 
The story of Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., and its subsidiary, Stolt-Nielsen 
Transportation Group Ltd. (collectively “Stolt-Nielsen”), a leading supplier 
of parcel tanker shipping services, began in March 2002 when Stolt-
Nielsen’s general counsel, Paul O’Brian, resigned.120  In a complaint filed in 
the Connecticut Superior Court in November 2002 and in a subsequent 
article in the Wall Street Journal, O’Brian claimed that he resigned after he 
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told his superiors about collusive trading practices between Stolt-Nielsen 
and two of its competitors, and the company failed to take responsive 
action.121  After O’Brian filed the complaint, Stolt-Nielsen hired John 
Nannes, a former deputy assistant attorney general with the Antitrust 
Division at the DOJ, to conduct an internal investigation to determine 
whether Stolt-Nielsen had violated any antitrust laws and to advise it 
regarding any criminal liability.122  As part of his investigation, Nannes met 
with the chairman of Stolt-Nielsen’s tanker division, Samuel Cooperman.123  
At the meeting, Cooperman told Nannes that O’Brian had raised some 
antitrust concerns and, in response to those concerns, the company had 
revised its antitrust compliance policy and distributed the new policy to 
employees and competitors.124  Additionally, Cooperman told Nannes that 
he thought an internal investigation would demonstrate that the company 
was in violation of federal antitrust laws, and he asked Nannes about the 
possibility of leniency from the DOJ.125   
Following this conversation and with Cooperman’s permission, Nannes 
spoke with an officer in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division  to inquire about Stolt-
Nielsen’s immunity options if the company admitted violations.126  The 
officer informed Nannes that based on the DOJ’s prior suspicions that Stolt-
Nielsen had been colluding with its competitors, the DOJ had already begun 
to investigate its behavior.127  Consequently, Stolt-Nielsen was limited to 
immunity under the second prong of the CLP, which offers immunity 
options for corporations reporting violations already under investigation.128   
Stolt-Nielsen’s ensuing investigation revealed that between 1998 and 
2001, one of the company’s executives exchanged customer lists with two 
of its competitors.129  The purported purpose of this exchange was to 
apportion customers among the companies and restrain competition.130  The 
lists proved that Stolt-Nielsen had indeed engaged in anticompetitive 
behavior, and the company promptly turned them over to the DOJ. 131   
On January 15, 2003, the DOJ entered into a conditional leniency 
agreement with Stolt-Neilson under the CLP.132  Pursuant to this agreement, 
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the DOJ agreed “not to bring any criminal prosecution against [Stolt-
Nielsen] for any act or offense it might have committed prior to the date of 
[the agreement] in connection with the anticompetitive activity being 
reported.”133  The agreement also provided that the DOJ would not 
prosecute officers and directors of Stolt-Nielsen who “admit[ted] their 
knowledge of, or participation in, and fully and truthfully cooperate[d] with 
the Antitrust Division in its investigation of the anticompetitive activity 
being reported.”134  The DOJ’s promise was, of course, conditioned upon 
Stolt-Nielsen’s strict compliance with the terms of the Conditional Leniency 
Agreement.135  Specifically, the DOJ could revoke the agreement if, at any 
time, it determined that Stolt-Nielsen had violated the leniancy agreement’s 
terms.136  Additionally, the agreement noted that in the event of breach by 
Stolt-Nielsen, the DOJ could use any evidence provided by Stolt-Nielsen 
against it in any ensuing prosecution.137  That is, if Stolt-Nielsen breached 
the agreement, it could not rely on any form of transactional immunity for 
protection.138  
The cooperation agreement specifically required that Stolt-Nielsen: 
produce all documents and records requested by the DOJ; (2) remain 
available for interviews with the DOJ; (3) provide full and truthful 
responses to all inquires by the DOJ “without falsely implicating any person 
or intentionally withholding any information”;139 (4) voluntarily provide 
any information or materials not requested by the DOJ that were 
nonetheless relevant to the investigation; and (5) testify under oath when 
asked by the DOJ.140  Based on the information provided by Stolt-Nielsen 
and its executives, the government was able to secure guilty pleas from 
Stolt-Nielsen’s co-conspirators, resulting in prison sentences for individual 
executives at those companies and fines totaling $62 million.141   
Things did not conclude as quickly for Stolt-Nielsen.  The government’s 
investigation revealed that Stolt-Nielsen had continued to participate in 
anticompetitive behavior for several months after O’Brian initially raised 
concerns to Cooperman.142  Despite the fact that Stolt-Nielsen had ceased 
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all anticompetitive activity before the agreement was signed (the terms of 
the agreement provided for immunity for any violations that took place 
before the agreement was signed), the DOJ reasoned that Stolt-Nielsen had 
breached the terms of its agreement because, after discovering 
anticompetitive activity, Stolt-Nielsen had not taken “prompt and effective 
action to terminate its part in the anticompetitive activity.”143  As a result, 
on April 8, 2003, the DOJ informed Stolt-Nielsen that it was suspending the 
company’s obligations under the agreement and considering withdrawal of 
its grant of conditional leniency.144 
On March 2, 2004, the Government withdrew its grant of conditional 
leniency to Stolt-Nielsen and announced that it intended to indict the 
company and one of its executives for violations of the Sherman Act.145  In 
response, Stolt-Nielsen sued the DOJ for enforcement of the immunity 
agreement and sought an injunction against indictment.146  The district court 
responded by granting Stolt-Nielsen’s injunction and holding that, in order 
to protect due process rights, it was essential to decide prior to the 
indictment whether Stolt-Nielsen had breached its immunity agreement.147 
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
separation of powers precluded the court from interfering with the executive 
branch’s “‘absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.’”148  
The court recognized that an exception exists to the constitutional bar from 
enjoining an indictment: when a criminal prosecution would violate 
constitutional rights and the violation would result in a chilling effect on the 
constitutional rights of others, or where the “mere threat of prosecution 
would inhibit the exercise of constitutional freedoms,”149 an injunction is 
appropriate.  Pointing out that no federal court had ruled that preindictment 
review is constitutionally required, the court held that, absent a chilling 
effect on constitutional rights, the mere existence of an immunity agreement 
did not provide it with the authority to enjoin the filing of an indictment.150  
The court concluded that postconviction review is sufficient.151   
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Stolt-Nielsen appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.  The Court 
initially denied certiorari on August 21, 2006,152 but this decision drew such 
a strong response (six amicus curiae briefs were filed153) that the court 
agreed to distribute the case for conference on October 27, 2006.154  On 
October 30, 2006, the Court again denied certiorari, letting the Third 
Circuit’s holding stand.155 
A. A Strange Result 
Since its 1993 revision, the CLP has been successful, at least in part, 
because it attacks the very trust that must underlie a successful cartel.156  In 
doing so, it creates a “prisoner’s dilemma” for cartel members.157  Each 
cartel member is aware of the substantial benefits available to the first 
company to come forward under the CLP and disclose the cartel’s 
anticompetitive activities, and each is aware of the substantial risks 
associated with not coming forward at all.158  Cartel members are thus left 
constantly wondering when one of the other members will leave the cartel 
and expose the remaining cartel members to significant liability.159  
Consequently, cartel members find themselves in a race of sorts to reach the 
DOJ first and receive immunity.160  This phenomenon has resulted in 
increases in both the total number of cartels reported and the total value of 
fines collected under the new CLP.161  In addition, the DOJ has credited the 
revised CLP with preventing cartels from forming in the first place by 
dissuading would-be members with a significant risk of exposure.162 
Under the revised CLP, the risks associated with cartel involvement are 
so substantial that expected profits after seeking CLP leniency are actually 
greater than those associated with staying in a cartel.163  Consequently, 
under the CLP, it makes more economic sense to cease antitrust activity 
than to remain part of a cartel.164  However, Stolt-Nielsen has changed the 
equation for would-be self-reporters by significantly increasing the risks 
associated with self-reporting.  That is, after Stolt-Nielsen, companies 
comparing the benefits of cartel activity with those of self-disclosure must 
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consider a new risk: despite having formed an immunity agreement with the 
DOJ, without the benefit of a preindictment judicial review of the 
agreement, the secured immunity will not necessarily preclude indictment 
and prosecution for an alleged breach of the agreement.  Suddenly, the 
rewards for self-disclosure appear far less substantial.  
1. The Deterrence Effect 
By increasing the risk associated with disclosing anticompetitive 
behavior under the CLP, the DOJ and the Third Circuit have, in essence, 
removed one of the primary incentives the CLP offers companies 
participating in anticompetitive behavior: the incentive of safety from 
indictment and prosecution.165  Elimination of this safety component is of 
paramount concern to companies for three main reasons. 
First, cartel activity has many benefits for its members.  Depending on 
the type of activity associated with a cartel, it can artificially raise prices 
leading to higher profits for member companies; it can eliminate 
competition and, consequently, the need for member companies to innovate 
(thereby saving research and development costs); and, through customer 
allocation, it can help member companies establish a strong customer 
base.166  While these results are not good for consumers or non-colluding 
businesses, they are good for the companies involved in cartels and provide 
a significant incentive to remain part of a cartel.167  Before Stolt-Nielsen, the 
safety of reporting anticompetitive activity under the CLP served as a 
significant deterrent for many would-be and existing cartel members 
because they feared that they would be reported by those former cartel 
members seeking immunity.168  However, the carrot has changed from safe, 
reliable immunity from prosecution to immunity from conviction (CLP 
participants now can seek only postindictment review of their immunity 
agreements).  As a result, the economic benefits of reporting cartel activity 
have decreased significantly because, as further discussed below, 
indictment and prosecution can come at a significant cost to a company’s 
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reputation.169  With the carrot now sour and the stick now mightier, 
increased cartel activity may result. 
Second, the impact an indictment can have on a corporation bolsters the 
concern that the court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen will likely lead to an 
increase in cartel activity.  Contrary to the court’s reasoning in Stolt-
Nielsen, indictment is more than a “painful obligation of citizenship” for a 
corporation or executive.170  Indictment can, quite literally, prove fatal to a 
corporation—regardless of whether the corporation is actually ever 
convicted of any wrongdoing.171  As noted in the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s amicus brief in support of Stolt-Nielsen’s petition for 
certiorari:  
[i]t is hardly news that the indictment of a corporation, coupled 
with adverse publicity, potential loss of various licenses and rights, 
disaffection of suppliers, customers, and financing institutions that 
might otherwise arrange loans, and possible suspension from 
government contracts, can be catastrophic, no matter how the 
criminal process ultimately concludes.172    
One amicus curiae illustrated this argument by reference to the fall of 
Arthur Andersen LLP.173  Once a major accounting firm, Andersen was 
indicted in 2002 in connection with the Enron scandal.174  Andersen was 
eventually cleared of all charges, but the damage had already been done, 
and the company was left largely in shambles.175  The amice further 
illustrated this point by referencing the story of the law firm Milberg 
Weiss.176  Once one of the nation’s wealthiest and most powerful law firms, 
Milberg Weiss had two partners indicted on fraud charges in May 2006.177  
According to the charges, Milberg Weiss had been paying some of its class 
action plaintiffs to sue.178  The charges against Milberg Weiss’ partners 
have yet to be settled, but the indictment’s impact on the firm was swift.179  
Following the indictment, a number of clients left Milberg Weiss, and the 
firm still struggles to survive.180  Similar to Arthur Andersen, Milberg 
Weiss suffered the damage of potential criminal involvement at indictment, 
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not conviction.181  Consequently, the court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen is 
likely to dissuade companies from entering into immunity agreements with 
the DOJ because they will fear the possibility of criminal indictment (and 
the financial harm that will result) if the DOJ suspects that they breached 
the terms of their  agreement. 
Finally, when a company comes forward to report anticompetitive 
activity and forms an immunity agreement under the CLP, the company is 
required to fully participate with the DOJ’s investigation.182  In addition to 
information related to the other cartel members, this cooperation involves a 
complete confession of the immunized company’s involvement in 
anticompetitive activities.183  As a result, any company indicted after 
participating in a CLP immunity agreement is in a far worse position than a 
newly discovered defendant because a CLP defendant will have already 
provided the government with all the information necessary to secure an 
indictment.184  Consequently, would-be self-reporters are likely to be 
dissuaded by the unavailability of preindictment judicial review after Stolt-
Nielsen.  
2. Harm to Customers and Businesses 
Anticompetitive activity is harmful to consumers and businesses alike.185  
Cartel activity in particular can lead to an increase in the prices consumers 
pay for a good or service by more than 10 percent.186  In addition, because 
participating companies do not need to compete with one another, their 
incentives to invest in innovation are greatly decreased, leaving consumers 
with less choice within the market.187  Cartel activity also hurts reputable 
businesses by putting them at a disadvantage in the marketplace because it 
forces them to compete with the significantly inflated market power 
enjoyed by a cartel.188  Furthermore, because it is by its very nature secret, 
cartel activity is difficult to identify and prosecute.189  Consequently, the 
advent of a workable incentive to encourage businesses and individuals to 
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come forward and disclose antitrust activity was, in many ways, an ideal 
solution. 
Following the 1993 amendments to the CLP, some argued that the 
revisions would hurt customers by limiting damages for the parties injured 
by antitrust violations; however, the results have been entirely inconsistent 
with this fear.190  Since the CLP was revamped, criminal antitrust fines have 
increased from an average of $29 million per year to well in excess of $100 
million per year.191  In addition, commentators argue that the revised CLP 
has led to a decrease in cartel activity (although the secret nature of cartel 
activity makes it impossible to state numbers with specificity).192  The 
revised CLP has thus offered significant benefits to both consumers and 
lawful businesses.  
However, Stolt-Nielsen has changed the equation for would-be self-
reporters by significantly increasing the risks associated with self-reporting.  
This increase in risk is likely to discourage violators from disclosing 
antitrust activity under the CLP, which in turn could lead to an increase in 
cartel activity, thereby harming innocent businesses and consumers.193  
III. RESURRECTING THE CLP 
Resurrecting the CLP in light of Stolt-Nielsen is not a simple task; 
however, its complexity does not arise solely from the terms of the court’s 
holding.  The complexity is also due to the difficulties inherent in providing 
a balanced corporate immunity policy.  That is, while corporate immunity—
at least in the antitrust context—has been shown to be advantageous to 
consumers, allowing corporate immunity too wide a breadth could lead to 
insufficient punishment for culpable parties and inadequate compensation 
for injured parties.194  In addition, separation of powers must, of course, be 
maintained.195  Therefore, Congress should respond to the problems Stolt-
Nielsen created by amending the Sherman Act to encourage self-disclosure 
of antitrust violations.  Below is proposed legislation I have drafted to serve 
this purpose.  Following the legislation, I explain how it would resurrect 
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antitrust enforcement in Stolt-Nielsen’s wake.  While I argue that legislation 
offers the best remedy, as an alternative approach, unless and until such 
legislation is codified, the DOJ should—on its own initiative—preserve the 
CLP’s effectiveness by seeking preindictment review of alleged breaches of 
immunity agreements. 
A. Proposed Legislation 
The Informal Immunity Act 
Material Breach shall be defined as a substantial breach of the 
agreement.  Material breach shall only constitute breach when it 
deprives one party of the benefit of the bargain.  For example, 
failures by the witness to disclose material that would have made a 
conviction possible is material breach.  In the case of contractual 
immunity agreements between the federal or state government and 
individuals or corporations: 
1. Once agreed to by both parties, such agreements are 
not subject to revocation absent material breach by 
one or both of the parties to the agreement.  
2. If one party believes the other party has materially 
breached the agreement, such party shall bring the 
alleged breach to the other party’s attention and 
attempt to resolve the issue amicably.  
3. If an amicable resolution is not possible, the party 
alleging breach shall bring the issue before a district 
court in the appropriate region for a judicial 
determination of breach. 
4. Any indictment under the Sherman Antitrust Act shall 
not take place until the district court judge has issued 
a ruling on whether or not the non-moving party 
materially breached the terms of the agreement. 
5. If the district court holds that the agreement has been 
materially breached, the non-breaching party may 
take remedial action; however, the information 
disclosed pursuant to the immunity agreement must 
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remain protected based on use plus derivative use 
immunity, and any evidence used in the prosecution 
of the previously immunized party must arise from a 
demonstrated independent source.  
6. If the district court holds that the agreement has not 
been breached, the parties are bound by this decision 
and must continue to abide by the terms of the 
agreement.  
1. The Proposed Legislation Clarifies the Concept of Breach 
Of significant concern after Stolt-Nielsen is the possibility that the DOJ 
will elect to terminate an immunity agreement formed under the CLP after 
the immunized company has provided incriminating information.  The 
proposed legislation addresses this concern in two ways.  First, the 
legislation clearly defines breach, and an example is provided to clarify the 
otherwise vague language.196  This specifically addresses the concern 
because it provides a clear measure by which the immunized company can 
gauge its behavior so that it can avoid conduct that constitutes a breach.  
This is a particularly important element because, as previously discussed, 
courts have not consistently defined the elements of a material breach.  
Second, the legislation provides for a secondary form of immunity in the 
event of breach.  This secondary form of immunity is use plus derivative 
use immunity, so that even if a party breaches its immunity agreement, the 
prosecutor cannot use the testimony obtained pursuant to the agreement to 
convict the corporation or individual.  The prosecutor must obtain the 
evidence independently. 
2. The Proposed Legislation Clarifies the Procedures for Managing 
Allegations of Breach 
Another component of the additional risks associated with post-Stolt-
Nielsen CLP immunity is the risk that the DOJ will unilaterally abrogate the 
terms of an immunity agreement, and the defendant will not have the 
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chance to defend him or herself.  This is a risk because regardless of how 
the parties define the terms or whether the company actually breached the 
immunity agreement, the law, after Stolt-Nielsen, does not clearly define the 
procedures and processes available to a company accused of breaching its 
immunity agreement.  Thus, a company considering whether or not it 
should self-disclose anticompetitive behavior cannot be certain what will 
happen if the DOJ believes it has breached its immunity agreement.  
The proposed legislation eliminates this risk because it requires the DOJ 
to bring the matter before a district court judge before it revokes a 
company’s immunity agreement and indicts the company for potential 
antitrust violations.  By clearly defining the process the DOJ must use to 
claim breach and companies’ options for defending such claims, the 
proposed legislation would allow companies to again enter into agreements 
under the CLP without fear of what will happen if the DOJ has reason to 
allege that they have breached their agreements. 
3. The Proposed Legislation Provides for Preindictment Determination 
of Breach 
As previously discussed, regardless of actual guilt, an indictment can lead 
to severe, if not fatal consequences for a corporation.  Consequently, the 
holding in Stolt-Nielsen—that preindictment judicial review is not 
required—is likely of significant concern to companies considering coming 
forward under the CLP.  
The proposed legislation is designed to remedy this issue by granting a 
preindictment hearing in which a district court judge would determine 
whether the company has actually materially breached the terms of its 
agreement.  The inclusion of a preindictment hearing is helpful because it 
allows for both parties to state their cases in a court of law, but it does so 
before the allegedly breaching party has suffered the financial harm of an 
indictment.   
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This proposed legislation also addresses the separation of powers issue 
raised by the court in Stolt-Nielsen.  The court in Stolt-Nielsen reasoned that 
the district court could not enjoin the prosecutor from indicting the 
company because to do so would constitute judicial interference into 
exclusively executive decisions, such as whom to indict.197  This legislation 
eliminates this concern by taking the decision out of the hands of the court.  
Despite the fact that this legislation limits the DOJ’s power to bring an 
indictment under certain circumstances, new separation of powers issues are 
not raised because the president would need to sign any legislation, and, 
like the DOJ, the president is part of the executive branch.  
4. The Proposed Legislation Furthers the Policy Goals of the CLP 
Three main policy goals underlie this proposed legislation.  First, it seeks 
to buttress the objectives of the CLP by encouraging self-disclosure of 
anticompetitive behavior.  Second, it seeks to reduce judicial waste by only 
allowing for the indictment and trial of those who have actually breached 
the terms of an immunity agreement.  Third, it seeks to ensure that victims 
of corporate crime are properly compensated for their losses.  
First, this proposed legislation seeks to enhance the policy goals of the 
CLP by encouraging companies to self-disclose antitrust violations.  The 
stated purposes of the CLP are to increase punishment and deterrence of 
anticompetitive behavior.198  This proposed legislation achieves this policy 
goal by clearly defining the processes by which a corporate immunity 
agreement can be challenged by the government and the defenses available 
to an immunized corporation.  By clearly defining these goals and ensuring 
that corporations have a just opportunity to defend against attempts by the 
DOJ to rescind immunity agreements, this legislation could encourage 
renewed corporate cooperation in the CLP and, in turn, could lead to 
increased punishment and deterrence of anticompetitive behavior.  
Second, the proposed legislation seeks to reduce judicial waste by 
preventing indictments when immunity agreements have not actually been 
416 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
breached.  Under Stolt-Nielsen, regardless of the merits of an alleged 
breach, the DOJ can indict the allegedly breaching company.  Under the 
proposed legislation, before indictment occurs, the government would be 
required to argue its case in a preindictment hearing, and the company 
would have the opportunity to defend its actions.  While this defense would 
take place in a hearing, the judicial resources required for a short hearing 
are much less than those required for a full trial.  The proposed legislation, 
therefore, would further the policy goal of judicial efficiency.  
Finally, the proposed legislation seeks to ensure that the victims of 
anticompetitive activity are fully compensated for losses resulting from the 
activity.  It does this by mitigating the risks Stolt-Nielsen created for self-
disclosing companies, thus encouraging companies to come forward under 
the CLP.  This would necessarily lead to more discoveries of unlawful 
behavior, more restitution for consumers, and a decrease in anticompetitive 
activity.  
B. DOJ Should Seek Preindictment Review 
A legislative solution to this problem would be ideal because it offers a 
clear and reliable way to communicate to businesses that the CLP still 
offers safe and effective immunity for companies coming forward to self-
disclose anticompetitive activity.  However, the realities of the situation 
must be recognized.  Specifically, the legislation proposed in this comment 
would limit executive power by preventing the DOJ from indicting 
companies that it believed had breached agreements formed under the CLP 
until it had established the breach through a preindictment hearing.  
Realistically, the president, as a member of the executive branch, is not 
likely to sign legislation that would limit the power of the executive.  
Therefore, in order to preserve the CLP’s effectiveness, the DOJ should 
develop a policy of affirmatively seeking preindictment review of any 
potential breaches of immunity agreements formed under the CLP, and it 
should promote this policy through speeches, press releases, and interviews. 
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While the DOJ may argue that a policy of conducting preindictment 
reviews is unduly burdensome, the benefits of such a policy far outweigh 
the costs.  The CLP represents one of the DOJ’s most valuable antitrust 
investigation tools, but its effectiveness has been undermined by Stolt-
Nielsen.  The policy would not be unduly burdensome for the DOJ to enact 
because, as noted by the Seventh Circuit in Meyers, the DOJ already has to 
obtain a judicial determination of a defendant’s breach after indictment but 
prior to trial.199  Thus, shifting the time at which this determination occurs is 
a “de minimis inconvenience for the DOJ to protect what it has described as 
its “single greatest investigative tool.”200 
A change in policy, however, is of little use if companies are not aware of 
it.  Therefore, in conjunction with this policy change, the DOJ should 
undertake significant marketing efforts to educate companies about the new 
policy and its implications.  
Following the DOJ’s 1993 launch of the revamped CLP, the DOJ took 
significant steps to ensure that companies were informed of the program’s 
amendments. 201  Specifically, it announced its revisions at an American Bar 
Association conference and followed up the announcement with several 
press releases.202  In the years since 1993, the DOJ has made a concerted 
effort to promote the program through speeches and press releases designed 
to communicate the program’s success.203   The DOJ’s promotional work 
has been supplemented by articles in mainstream media such as Forbes and 
the Financial Times, which have broadcast the CLP’s protections to 
businesses around the world.204  The record settlements secured under the 
CLP have also led to significant press coverage.205  Some companies have 
added to the media coverage by issuing their own press releases announcing 
their cooperation agreements with the DOJ.206 
This coverage has been credited with increasing the number of 
companies coming forward under the CLP.207  However, many of the 
positive messages communicated by the DOJ and the many news sources 
that encouraged companies to come forward under the revised CLP were 
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undermined by the significant news coverage of Stolt-Nielsen.  Thus, in 
order to encourage businesses to again come forward under the revised 
CLP, the DOJ should engage in significant marketing efforts to promote its 
new policy. 
Specifically, the DOJ should announce its policy in a public forum such 
as a national conference.  In this announcement, the DOJ should 
acknowledge the concerns many companies are likely experiencing after 
Stolt-Nielsen and assure them that it has instituted a national policy of 
refraining from indictment before proving that a company has indeed 
breached the terms of its leniency agreement.  Following this 
announcement, the DOJ should issue press releases to each of the main 
news outlets and post the releases on its own Web site.  As a final step in its 
promotional plan, the DOJ should encourage its deputy assistant attorney 
general for criminal enforcement of the Antitrust Division to seek 
interviews with mainstream media like the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and 
The New York Times to publicize the DOJ’s revised policies to businesses 
that might not be adept at researching legal developments through other 
avenues. 
Thus, while a legislative solution would be ideal, unless and until such a 
solution is codified, the DOJ should, on its own initiative, modify its 
policies to prohibit indictment without first seeking a determination of 
breach, and it should aggressively promote the modification in order to 
restore the force of the CLP.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the Third Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen and the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decision to deny review made little impact in the eyes of 
most American consumers, the courts’ decisions have the potential to 
significantly affect American consumers and lawful businesses.  This 
impact stems from the two distinct and equally important factors: (1) the 
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harm caused by antirust violations, and (2) the difficulty inherent in 
discovering and prosecuting antitrust violators.  
The Third Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen exacerbated these factors by 
undermining what had been a very successful program for encouraging self-
disclosure of anticompetitive behavior, the DOJ’s CLP.  After Stolt-Nielsen, 
the CLP is a far riskier proposition than it once was.  Companies now are 
likely to think carefully before reporting antitrust activity under its terms, 
and customers and lawful businesses are likely to suffer the consequences.  
However, it is not too late to reinvigorate the CLP and encourage 
companies to come forward under its terms.  Congress should mitigate the 
impact of Stolt-Nielsen though an amendment to the Sherman Act designed 
to reincentivize companies to self-report antitrust violations.  Should such 
legislation not be enacted, the DOJ should—on its own initiative—institute 
and promote a policy of seeking preindictment review of alleged breaches 
of immunity agreements in order to preserve effectiveness of its own 
program, the CLP.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 
 
The Division has a policy of according leniency to corporations reporting 
their illegal antitrust activity at an early stage, if they meet certain 
conditions. “Leniency” means not charging such a firm criminally for the 
activity being reported. (The policy also is known as the corporate amnesty 
or corporate immunity policy.) 
 
A. Leniency Before an Investigation Has Begun  
 
Leniency will be granted to a corporation reporting illegal activity before an 
investigation has begun, if the following six conditions are met: 
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report 
the illegal activity, the Division has not received 
information about the illegal activity being reported 
from any other source;  
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal 
activity being reported, took prompt and effective 
action to terminate its part in the activity;  
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor 
and completeness and provides full, continuing and 
complete cooperation to the Division throughout the 
investigation;  
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, 
as opposed to isolated confessions of individual 
executives or officials;  
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to 
injured parties; and  
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6. The corporation did not coerce another party to 
participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not 
the leader in, or originator of, the activity.  
B. Alternative Requirements for Leniency  
 
If a corporation comes forward to report illegal antitrust activity and does 
not meet all six of the conditions set out in Part A, above, the corporation, 
whether it comes forward before or after an investigation has begun, will be 
granted leniency if the following seven conditions are met:  
1. The corporation is the first one to come forward and 
qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity 
being reported;  
2. The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, 
does not yet have evidence against the company that 
is likely to result in a sustainable conviction;  
3. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal 
activity being reported, took prompt and effective 
action to terminate its part in the activity;  
4. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor 
and completeness and provides full, continuing and 
complete cooperation that advances the Division in its 
investigation;  
5. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, 
as opposed to isolated confessions of individual 
executives or officials;  
6. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to 
injured parties; and  
7. The Division determines that granting leniency would 
not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the 
illegal activity, the confessing corporation’s role in it, 
and when the corporation comes forward.  
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In applying condition 7, the primary considerations will be how early the 
corporation comes forward and whether the corporation coerced another 
party to participate in the illegal activity or clearly was the leader in, or 
originator of, the activity. The burden of satisfying condition 7 will be low 
if the corporation comes forward before the Division has begun an 
investigation into the illegal activity. That burden will increase the closer 
the Division comes to having evidence that is likely to result in a 
sustainable conviction.  
 
C. Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees  
 
If a corporation qualifies for leniency under Part A (above), all directors, 
officers, and employees of the corporation who admit their involvement in 
the illegal antitrust activity as part of the corporate confession will receive 
leniency, in the form of not being charged criminally for the illegal activity, 
if they admit their wrongdoing with candor and completeness and continue 
to assist the Division throughout the investigation.  
 
If a corporation does not qualify for leniency under Part A (above), the 
directors, officers, and employees who come forward with the corporation 
will be considered for immunity from criminal prosecution on the same 
basis as if they had approached the Division individually.  
 
D. Leniency Procedure  
 
If the staff that receives the request for leniency believes the corporation 
qualifies for and should be accorded leniency, it should forward a favorable 
recommendation to the Office of Operations, setting forth the reasons why 
leniency should be granted. Staff should not delay making such a 
recommendation until a fact memo recommending prosecution of others is 
prepared. The Director of Operations will review the request and forward it 
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to the Assistant Attorney General for final decision. If the staff recommends 
against leniency, corporate counsel may wish to seek an appointment with 
the Director of Operations to make their views known. Counsel are not 
entitled to such a meeting as a matter of right, but the opportunity will 
generally be afforded.208 
 
 
                                                 
1 The author recognizes that M. Ryan William’s article, The Devil They Know: The 
DOJ’s Flawed Leniency Program and its Curious Pursuit of Stolt-Nielsen, Recent 
Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 974 (2007), was recently published and would like to note 
that this comment was written prior to its publication, and that the conclusions and 
opinions expressed herein are independent of those expressed by M. Ryan Williams.  
2 JD candidate, Seattle University School of Law, May 2008. The author would like to 
thank her husband, Ryan Tilley, for his endless encouragement, patience, and 
understanding; her mother, Rachel Goodman, for her love, support, and infinite 
willingness to proofread; Leah Harris, Jessica Levin, KoKo Huang, and Chris Maryatt for 
their ever helpful comments and contributions, their time, and their continuous support; 
and Kelly Kunsch for his incredible patience and assistance. 
3 Stolt-Nielsen v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
494 (2006). 
4 Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 184. 
5 See id. 
6 See id.; State of Delaware, Division of Corporations, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last 
visited Oct 13, 2007).  
7 Glenn Harrison & Matthew Bell, Recent Enhancements in Antitrust Criminal 
Enforcement: Bigger Sticks and Sweeter Carrots, 6 HOUS. BUS. AND TAX L.J. 207, 211 
(2006). 
8 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER 3–4, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2007). 
9 Id. at 2. 
10 Id. at 1.  
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 3–4 (describing how cartels function). 
13 See generally J. Anthony Chavez, The Carrot and the Stick Approach to Antitrust 
Enforcement, in 47TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, at 519 (PLI Corporate Law 
& Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8736, 2006), available at Westlaw, 1542 
PLI/Corp 519. 
14 See id. at 527. 
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